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This paper will explore problems and potential solutions for a moral theory that claims our most basic and powerful deontological rights stem from our self-ownership. Call this the Self-Ownership Thesis. Such views have attracted those yearning for an explanation and vindication of the thought that we enjoy powerful protections from interference when we are minding our own business even if more social good would result if we were interfered with.​[2]​ After all, you may not take my kidney without my consent merely because it could do more good elsewhere. Self-ownership is attractive because it appears to offer a satisfyingly direct and not very hostage to empirical fortune justification for such protections. That something is mine—that I own it—provides an obvious and much relied upon rationale for my authority over what may happen to a thing even when others can create more good with it. Further, it is deeply plausible that one has a non-conventional claim to decide what may be done with one’s body and to not having it messed with without one’s consent. Self-ownership, far from a cobbled together rationalization for protecting the privileges of the privileged, is an intuitive and tempting foundation for a non-consequentialist morality.​[3]​ Small wonder, then, that leftist non-consequentialist egalitarians are now busily exploring the prospects of vindicating their view from within a self-ownership framework. 
And of course self-ownership does not only protect our kidneys. It is also thought to grant us broad protections from coercion when we are engaged in self-regarding actions with other competent self-owners. Let’s call the attractive set of rights that libertarian self-ownership views are thought to vindicate, the Millian liberties. Consequentialism, it is often thought, makes the protection of our Millian liberties too hostage to empirical fortune for we can easily imagine cases in which interfering with a person’s Millian liberties creates more value. Self-ownership views, it is thought, provide a more secure, and therefore more attractive, justification for such liberties. 
The Self-Ownership Thesis is traditionally taken to maintain that only rarely, at best, may we infringe upon the property rights of the one for the sake of the good of the many.​[4]​  Thus it is, at best, rare that we may tax the rich merely to benefit the poor or take a person’s spare kidney or blood just because it is badly needed elsewhere. More generally, there are classes of actions that infringe upon a person’s property rights and we enjoy powerful, if not absolute, protections from all such actions. On this conception, my property rights, whether they protect something important to me or not, provide powerful protections. This is what allows the above simple and powerful argument against a range of activity that would infringe upon what a person owns without requiring an investigation into the significance of the infringement. 
I will argue that the most plausible understanding of the rights of self-ownership is significantly different from the traditional understanding. I will argue that maintaining that we are entitled to powerful protections against even trivial infringements on our property has consequences no one is willing to accept. Rather, the most plausible understanding of the rights of property owners must allow that small infringements for significant gains are quite generally permissible.​[5]​ Two implications of what I claim is the genuine upshot of the Self-Ownership Thesis are particularly at odds with the traditional understanding. First, I claim that, best understood, our rights of self-ownership do not provide powerful protections against all redistributive takings of our property. The strength of the claim that we have against redistributive efforts that involve infringing property rights for the sake of promoting the social good is significantly more variable, and thus sometimes much weaker, than the tradition supposes. Thus it will not infrequently be permissible to take some property from a person who will little miss it and give it to those who truly need it. Secondly, I claim the Self-Ownership Thesis’s vindication of our Millian liberties remains importantly hostage to empirical fortune. If I am right, proponents and opponents of self-ownership libertarianism have significantly misunderstood what the moral upshot would be of our being self-owners. Further, while the upshot I claim flows from The Self-Ownership Thesis is more congenial to my consequentialism-polluted intuitions than the traditional view, I avoid reliance on such intuitions in shaping the rights of self-ownership. I aim to argue for my non-traditional conception of the rights that flow from self-ownership using only intuitions that libertarians and non-libertarians share.
The plan for the paper is to start with a problem for the Self-Ownership Thesis. The problem is that it is implausible that we enjoy the same degree of protection against all actions that infringe upon our self-ownership. If we enjoyed such powerful protection against trivial infringements too much would be impermissible. Your trivial pollution, for example, that eventually falls to the earth and causes some small risk of minor skin irritation, would seem to infringe upon my property rights over my skin.​[6]​ If so, the Self-Ownership Thesis threatens to make all fires impermissible unless they are unanimously consented to by everyone that might be affected by them. Nozick saw this worry and significantly adjusted his view to try to solve this problem. Peter Railton emphasized this problem in arguing that such views are fundamentally problematic.​[7]​ After explicating this worry further, I offer what I take to be the most natural and plausible fix; namely that we allow that different property infringements are differentially important and we are owed different levels of protection against them. We will also consider at length and reject a few attempts to solve the problem without this move.
Then I turn to the issue of how we might understand what makes one property right weightier than another. Broadly, one might use an objective or subjective measure of the significance of different infringements. I argue that the objective measure, divorced as it is from the agent’s own assessment of the significance of the infringement, abandons the self-ownership framework for our rights. Alternatively, one might tie the strength of the right to the strength of the agent’s contingent concern about the infringement. The latter, I claim, fails to vindicate the thought that there are classes of actions, such as self-regarding actions or acts that infringe upon our freedom of religion, that we all enjoy powerful protections from. Rather, the upshot of such a view would be that we are only owed powerful protections against infringements that we quite mind. On such a view, some will enjoy only quite weak protections against some property infringements. In sum, distinguishing the size of the protections we are owed against various infringements, as seems the most plausible way to develop the framework, forces self-ownership views into unfamiliar waters in which our Millian liberties are once again hostage to empirical fortune. While it seems awkward to count it as a cost of the emerging view that it would generally allow as permissible redistributive taxation of money (or hair) from those who little feel the loss to those who are seriously in need, this would be a most significant change in the view.
I should also emphasize that I am claiming that a self-ownership view that does not allow that differentially significant infringements merit different levels of protection has grave difficulties and I have not found a way to make them plausible. If such views are not plausible, then self-ownership views are forced to take what may well feel to be a half-step towards consequentialism. The moral disvalue of infringements would be more broadly fungible for social good than such views have traditionally supposed. However, it is important to see that the resulting view would remain deontological and rights-based rather than consequentialist. The resulting view could say that you may not impose infringement harm of size N on me just to avoid 5N of harm befalling others. But the view does abandon the odd but traditional thought that the size of the infringement harm to me of your action has no impact on the amount of social good needed to make such an infringement permissible.​[8]​

1: The Failure to Distinguish the Seriousness of Property Infringements

Some actions are morally worse than others. It is not merely that the morally permissible acts are better than the impermissible. Some bad types of actions are worse than others. I have a claim that you not take my tennis racket without asking but it is worse to so take my kidney. And in a range of cases how morally bad an action is affects how much social good can make such actions permissible. If the only way to save Joe’s life is to use my racket without my permission then surely you may do so. But if Joe will die unless you take my kidney it still seems you may not take it. If Joe will be run over by a bus unless you push his body out of the way without being able to get his consent beforehand, you may do so. But you may not do so just for a laugh.​[9]​
Some imaginable deontological theories would have difficulty explaining this. The class of deontological theories that seem to be embarrassed by this difficulty I will call “Broad, All or Nothing” deontological theories. Such views aim to illuminate a broad swath of the moral terrain with a single principle. Further, this principle most naturally suggests that an action either fully has the morally problematic feature or fully fails to have it. Intuitively the problem is that such views conflate cases on the trivial end of the spectrum and on the serious end and treat them as if there were equally morally important. Call this the Conflation Problem. The case that springs to mind here is Kant, especially his Universal Law formulations of the categorical imperative. Contradictions, whether in the will or in conception, seem to be all or nothing rather than coming in degrees. Further, Kantians interpret the Universal Law formulations such that it is meant to settle a very wide swath of morality.​[10]​ Thus I suspect that at least Kant’s Universal Law formulations will prove vulnerable to the kind of concerns urged here.​[11]​ This paper will be focused only on how this worry plays out for the Self-Ownership Thesis. But the conclusions I draw here apply at least against any view that claims we have uniformly strong property rights forceful enough to vindicate the stringent traditional conclusions against nearly all re-distribution and paternalism, whether such a scheme is justified via self-ownership or not. 
Some terminological issues must briefly detain us. I will refer to unconsented to crossings upon another person’s property, with Nozick, as a “boundary” or “border” crossing. One would have naturally expected that a view that takes property rights very seriously would maintain that at least all harmful border crossings without consent are rights infringements. However, according to some views, as we will see, a boundary crossing would only become a rights infringement if, for example, adequate compensation is not paid or if the harm from the crossing exceeds a certain threshold.​[12]​ An infringement involves doing something that someone’s rights protect her against. Nonetheless, a rights infringement could potentially be permissible, at least according to non-absolutist variants of the view, if it would, for example, avoid a catastrophe.​[13]​ In such cases let us say the infringement is justified. Infringements that are not so justified are impermissible and violate a person’s rights.​[14]​
Traditional self-ownership views have tended to have the two features that generate the Conflation Problem. Such views aspire to illuminate a wide swath of the moral terrain, perhaps all of enforceable morality. And such views have tended to suggest that an action either fully infringes a property right to one’s own body or it fully fails to do so. Intuitively a theory that has the Conflation Problem will either treat serious matters too lightly or treat trivial matters too seriously. In the self-ownership tradition infringements have always been taken to be a very big deal. Thus the way the Conflation Problem will manifest itself in such a view will be by treating relatively trivial infringements as if they were more significant than they are. The friend of the Self-Ownership Thesis might try to persuade us that it is appropriate to treat such radically different infringements with equal care. This would be to argue that while the view does conflate seriously different sorts of infringements, it is not a problem that it does so. I think when we see the upshot of this strategy we will find this implausible. Alternatively, the view could be modified to avoid the most dramatic sorts of Conflation Problems.




Nozick briefly but illuminatingly considered the view that border crossings must involve at least a certain threshold of harm to count as an infringement and rejected such views. In doing so he highlighted important issues concerning risk. He wrote
Actions that risk crossing another’s boundary pose serious problems for natural-rights positions…. Imposing how slight a probability of a harm that violates someone’s rights also violates his rights? Instead of one cutoff probability for all harms, perhaps the cutoff probability is lower the more severe the harm. Here one might have the picture of a specified value, the same for all acts, to mark the boundary of rights violations; an action violates someone’s rights if its expected harm to him … is greater than the specified value. [74]

In other words, to count as an infringement an action that risks crossing a border would have to produce above a threshold level of expected harm. But against that tempting modification, Nozick continued

This construal of the problem cannot be utilized by a tradition which holds that stealing a penny or a pin or anything from someone violates his rights. That tradition does not select a threshold measure of harm as a lower limit, in the case of harms certain to occur. It is difficult to imagine a principled way in which the natural rights tradition can draw the line to fix which probabilities impose unacceptably great risks upon others. [75]

Nozick’s reasoning here seems to me persuasive, if in need of some fleshing out. Nozick is charitably interpreted as thinking not only that historically self-ownership views have held that there is not a lower limit of border crossing harm below which the action does not count as an infringement (No Lower Limit), but that the tradition has good reasons for that commitment. What might those reasons be? Nozick does not much speak to this question. Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (VSO) offer several possible responses to the Conflation Problem, including the possibility of rejecting No Lower Limit. We will shortly consider difficulties in rejecting No Lower Limit in the context of assessing VSO’s view.
For now I will just say that Nozick’s argument seems sound that if there is no lower limit to the amount of boundary crossing harm that constitutes an infringement in cases of harms certain to occur, then there is no principled ground for maintaining there is such a limit in cases of risk or expected harm. In other words, if we accept No Lower Limit we must accept No Lower Expected Limit.​[16]​
When we turn our attention away from the question of whether or not an act constituted an infringement and to the question of how much social good it would take to make such an infringement permissible, new options open up. We want to say that I have some claim against your stealing my penny or my pin, but we also want to say that I enjoy less protection against your borrowing my tennis racket than stealing my kidney. And we could say all this by saying that as the significance of the infringement diminishes, the size of the social good needed to make such actions permissible becomes less. So, we could seemingly vindicate our commonsense intuitions here if we said that if you need to borrow my racket without my permission to ward off an attacker, doing so does infringe upon my property rights, but if things will be very bad if you do not so infringe, it may well nonetheless be permissible for you to do so. 
It is not clear that Nozick considered the possibility of selling different infringements at different prices.​[17]​ In any case, recall that Nozick expresses agnosticism between an absolutist view and one that allows that an infringement is permissible to avoid a “catastrophic moral horror.”​[18]​ Both of these views suggest that the size of social good needed to make permissible any infringement, regardless of its significance, remains constant; that is “All Infringements are Equal.” The view need not be that all infringements are in all ways normatively alike, but rather only that in terms of the amount of social good needed to make such an infringement permissible, they are equal. 
Otsuka makes clear that the strict rights of self-ownership he accepts cover one’s hair and so he is committed to strict rights even against trivial infringements. Thus one might be encouraged to think that he is committed to All Infringements are Equal. In passing however, Otsuka seems favorably disposed to a luxury tax on that which is self-owned but not necessary for a decent life if such a tax could prevent people from freezing to death.​[19]​ Such thoughts do not get further discussion but the view just described may look as though it requires the thought that different infringements are being sold at different prices (infringements not very harmful to the owner being sold more cheaply than infringements that are—hence the tax only on what is a luxury). Still it seems fair to me to say that Otsuka affirms a very stringent, if not absolute, right over one’s hair even if the harm to one of it being taken is trivial. Perhaps we may say that while Otsuka is not clearly committed to All Infringements are Equal, he is clearly committed to All Infringements are a Very Big Deal. 
Vallentyne calls himself, in conversation, a reluctant absolutist. I take it to be clear that all absolutists must accept All Infringements are Equal. Vallentyne claims that even in cases in which slightly injuring a person would save millions of lives, the self-ownership of the one who would be injured makes it unjust to impose such an injury.​[20]​
As I discuss elsewhere, Nozick tries to respond to cases where even trivial pollution might be thought to infringe on so many rights as to be impermissible not by distinguishing between more and less harmful infringements but by appeal to what I call “cross and compensate”. Cross and compensate permits us to harmfully cross other people’s boundaries provided we provide enough compensation to make the person whose boundary is crossed at least as well off by her own lights as she would have been had the crossing not taken place. On this view, a border crossing would only become an infringement if such compensation were not provided. Thus our pollution case could end up infringing on no rights. But if the compensation were not provided, then even trivial pollution would still amount to a full infringement and be permissible only to avoid a catastrophe. Nozick, characteristically for champions of views in the neighborhood of self-ownership, tries to find ways to fix problems that intuitively have to do with differentially significant infringements by fiddling with what counts as the one-size fits all infringement.​[21]​
All Infringements are Equal, by my lights unattractive on its own, becomes intolerable when combined with No Lower Limit. A view with both of these features seems to force us to conclude that flying a plane over a person’s head with a one in a trillion chance of the plane braking down and crashing into that person must be counted as a rights infringement. And, since on this view rights infringements are normatively a big deal, we seem to reach the conclusion that flying planes, emitting pollution, etc. are going to be generally impermissible as such actions will involve infringing on many people’s rights. If any unconsented to use of or risk to a person’s property is an infringement even if the use is nearly harmless, and if our rights against any infringement are very strong, the predictable consequence is that, for example, even innocuous pollution that results from badly needed activity such as building a fire is a violation unless it is universally consented to. This combination threatens to make impermissible a range of activity needed to enjoy an acceptable level of liberty. Presumably even throwing a stick for my dog would be impermissible given the very small chance that it may hit an unseen person and so infringe her rights.​[22]​ Accepting both No Lower Limit and All Infringements are Equal yields an unacceptably severe version of the Conflation Problem.
We might try saying that risks to a person’s property that do not eventuate in harms are not infringements. But this will not help against trivial actual border-crossings, such as some possible pollution cases, and it will make surprisingly problematic our claim that others not play Russian roulette with us against our will.​[23]​
I will treat views that make impermissible any sized risk of even trivial infringements as implausible. Certainly such views no longer seem attractive from the point of view of liberty. Although such issues do not get enough direct attention, I believe that traditional versions of the self-ownership view tends to combine No Lower Limit and All Infringements are Equal and then struggle with the consequences I am highlighting here. This combination is unpromising. If the friend of self-ownership had to give up one of the two, All Infringements are Equal seems the more tempting option to lose as it is less intuitively plausible and, as I will shortly argue, rejecting No Lower Limit is problematic. We will therefore shortly be focusing on how the view might go without this component.
But there may still appear to be another way out of this jam without abandoning All Infringements are Equal. One might try saying that we only infringe a right of someone when we do so intentionally or when we use them as a means in the pursuit of our plans. Michael Otsuka takes such a path, suggesting that our rights of self-ownership protect us only from being intentionally used as a means or from taking from us income earned with using only our own bodies.​[24]​ But as I have argued at more length elsewhere, this would leave our bodies unprotected from other people blowing up an area near our property to clear some land, foreseeing that this would kill us.​[25]​ Doing so is not intentionally using us as a means in the relevant sense.​[26]​ Such a move would, most charitably interpreted, radically sacrifice the breadth aspiration of self-ownership views, leaving such views significantly incomplete even concerning enforceable morality and require significant supplementation even concerning what claims we have that others not mess with our bodies. Further, I take it to be clear that owning something gives one claims well beyond others not intentionally using it as a means without one’s consent. Thus I think we can safely set aside such views.
I believe there are several reasons why it is no accident that traditional forms of the Self-Ownership Thesis have been developed in ways that generate such severe Conflation Problems.​[27]​ One of these reasons is the strength of the Cohen-inspired understanding of the rights of ownership which straightaway generates very severe Conflation Problems. I discuss this below. But here I will speculate that part of the problem stems from its advocates focusing on offering a corrective to the perceived unacceptable willingness of consequentialism to violate the claims of the one for the sake of the group. Nozick generalized from cases in which the one is seriously sacrificed for others towards principles that make it a Very Big Deal if the one suffers even incredibly minor infringements for the sake of the group. Recall that Nozick only contemplated tolerating any infringement if was needed to avoid a catastrophe. When we remind ourselves how minor infringements can be, granted No Lower Limit, and we keep in mind Nozick’s point about what this requires that we say of actions that impose very tiny risks, we see that treating every bit of infringement-harm as a Very Big Deal is implausible. Nozick wrote that the sort of side-constraints he championed
reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others. This root idea, namely that there are different individuals with separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints.​[28]​ 

This statement, which develops Nozick’s Kantian rationale for side-constraints, taken literally, rules out the most trivial infringement even if it would produce amazingly important benefits. It can seem that it is Nozick’s Kantian rationale that is the problem we have found here. The commitment to not sacrifice the one, no matter how trivially, for the sake of the many, immediately threatens us with Conflation Problems. Our example of pollution shows just how difficult it is to literally accept the view Nozick expresses above. Such thoughts amount to an over-reaction to the perceived excessive willingness of consequentialism to sacrifice the one for the sake of the group. We are finding that not only do the cases of pollution and risk show difficulties with absolutist variants of the view but also that it puts great pressure on the idea that All Infringements are Equal and on All Infringements are a Very Big Deal.

3: Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka: Towards The Obvious Solution

By now it may well seem that part of the problem is stemming from indeterminacy in exactly what rights I have in virtue of being a self-owner. G. A. Cohen responded to the persistent worry that self-ownership is problematically indeterminate by offering a principled way of sharpening the proposal. He maintained that “the stipulation that self-ownership confers the fullest right a person (logically) can have over herself provided that each other person also has just such a right generates a procedure for determining the content of self-ownership.”​[29]​ Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (VSO) follow Cohen in insisting that their proposal is made more determinate by appealing to the notion of full self-ownership. Full self-ownership “is simply (roughly) the logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly with others having such rights over everything else.” They claim such an understanding of “full-ownership has a relatively determinate content.”​[30]​ They then note that this notion of full self-ownership, what they eventually call strict self-ownership, “has some rather radical implications.” These include the claim that my self-ownership is violated “if, in the process of putting out a dangerous fire, you inadvertently send a small bit of stone one hundred yards away, where it lightly flicks my hand. Most people with strong libertarian inclinations will want to reject these implications and thus reject full self-ownership in the strict sense.”​[31]​
In response, VSO tell us that their view is compatible with four possible exceptions, in any combination, from full self-ownership. The exceptions are actions where it is the case that:
1)	there is only a very small probability that it will result in an incursion against oneself
2)	if there is an incursion, the harm to oneself will be trivial
3)	the harm was not reasonably foreseeable
4)	the benefits to others of performing the action are enormous (e.g. avoidance of social catastrophe).
The first thing that should strike us about this proposal is that it is ad hoc. There is no effort to make a case that the overall proposal has any more unity than a determinate conception of self-ownership together with four independent exceptions to handle counter-intuitive cases.
Further, although the Cohen-inspired understanding of the content of the rights of self-ownership is theoretically attractive and principled, it seems inevitably to force the view into the unacceptable corners I have been discussing. The exceptions VSO allow here are just the sort that both seem most obviously needed to make the view plausible and yet to inevitably and by design fail to provide “the logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly with others having such rights over everything else.”​[32]​ The Cohen-inspired conception, despite its significant virtues, will inevitably lead the view towards exactly the implausible results that VSO’s modifications are designed to avoid. There seems to be a significant tension between this principled way to understand what the rights of self-ownership are and the more plausible understandings of our rights. As I will argue below, rejecting All Infringements Are Equal seems the least ad hoc way of addressing the problem even though it will continue to conflict with the Cohen-inspired understanding of the rights of self-ownership.
VSO’s exceptions do not handle the counter-intuitive cases satisfactorily, I will argue. Obviously I cannot here show this for each of the 16 variants of VSO’s proposal. What I will hope to do here is show that the general shape of each of the exceptions they offer do not individually look to be adequate. Recall that we have already considered the prospects for non-absolutist versions of the view that permits rights infringements to avoid catastrophes (VSO’s fourth option) and found that this move on its own failed to distinguish adequately between more and less serious rights violations and so was unable to make permissible intuitively acceptable risks and pollution. 
VSO’s third option that there is no rights violation if the harm was not reasonably foreseeable seems unhelpful. Saying that a border-crossing was not “reasonably foreseeable” might be taken to mean that such a crossing was very unlikely. If we take it this way, it collapses into the first VSO response that I will consider below. But instead we might take it to suggest that the focus should be on the reasonable subjective probabilities available to the actor, not on the objective chance that an action would cross a border. So understood, the distinction is of little help with our problem. The cases that are causing the problem for supposing that our property rights are uniformly very strong are cases of trivial harm or risk. The problem is just as acute in cases where the actor is aware of the small risk.  
I speculate that the reason Russian roulette with a great many chambers seems obviously impermissible and flying a normally safe plane seems obviously permissible, despite both activities imposing the same chance of border-crossing harm, has nothing to do with the foreseeability of the harm and everything to do with the significantly different amounts of social good likely to be created by such actions.​[33]​
Let us now consider the two last modifications VSO offer to full-ownership which essentially amount to rejecting No Lower Limit. Consider first the idea that if the risk of a boundary crossing is small enough, this amounts to no infringement at all. First, as Nozick showed above, this proposal is unmotivated if we accept No Lower Limit in non-risky cases. Second, there will implausibly be cases where risks just below the threshold are no problem as far as rights are concerned but just over it is a full rights infringement.  Such views will be forced to maintain that arbitrarily small additional impositions of risks make a very great moral difference—a much greater difference than a larger amount of risk that took us near to the threshold. Third, this would mean that a state lottery in which there is a small chance that the rich have their assets redistributively taxed, would not violate the rights of the rich. Nor would a similar lottery where my organs would be used for others.  Fourth, this would mean that we did not have a right that others not play Russian roulette with our head so long as the chance of killing us is small enough. Fifth, uncoordinated acts each of which is below the threshold could add up to an arbitrarily high chance of an infringement yet no one infringes upon my rights.​[34]​ Sixth, some acts that bring no one’s risk above a threshold could raise a lot of people’s risk a little. Presumably the standards should be higher for imposing a small risk on billions of people than it should be for imposing such a risk on one person. Releasing a carcinogen that has a one in a billion chance of killing those who inhale it is very different if it is imposed on only one person than if it is imposed on a billion people. Seventh, nothing has yet been said about the value of the risk-imposing act to the person who imposes the risk. Surely if the act promises only trivial or no value for the actor, or only an infinitesimal prospect of a value, then such actions should be less permissible. For example, if the act promises an N chance of a benefit to the actor and it imposes a 2N chance of an infringement-loss of that same sized benefit to the person affected by the act, then presumably the act should not be permitted even when 2N is still a quite small risk.
Let us now consider VSO’ final amendment; the view that if an act would harm someone only a small amount, below some low threshold, it would not amount to a property infringement. This is just to reject No Lower Limit. Against this view, note first that the second, fifth, sixth, and seventh concerns above about imposing small risks can obviously be modified to pose problems in the case of small harms. Second, as Nozick pointed out, what would happen to ownership rights over a pen or a pin if relatively trivial harms did not count as rights violations? Third, we might see property rights as fundamental and pre-social natural rights or we might see the institution of property as itself justified by considerations of social value. Allowing that our property rights are not violated in cases in which we are harmed only slightly suggests the latter picture.​[35]​ Such a picture would make perfect sense if the point of the institution of property was to serve as a very socially useful convention. 
The good thing about VSO’s exceptions from full self-ownership is that they allow us to mark important moral distinctions between actions that impose tiny risks and other kinds of actions that impose greater risks, actions that impose great harms and actions that impose less than great harms, and actions that would infringe rights but produce tremendous benefits and actions that would not produce such great benefits. All of this is helpful and moves in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, these moves remain uncoordinated and ad hoc and, because they are developed only to allow exceptions when harm or risk is very small or benefit is very large, they miss a great many other distinctions that should matter to us. For example, we presumably also want to distinguish between and treat differently the imposition of mid-sized risk and very high risk. It is hard to see a principled rationale for allowing that some such differences matter a lot and others matter not at all.
There is an obvious way to remedy these problems with VSO’s proposal. We could let the badness of the rights infringement vary continuously with the size of the risk and the harm. And we could sell different sized infringements for different amounts of social welfare. What seems plausible, and what VSO’s modifications from the implications of full self-ownership begin to capture, is that the lower the risk of an infringement an act causes, and the less harm it threatens, the cheaper it should be in terms of social utility to make permissible. The most obvious view in this neighborhood would say that as the welfare costs of an infringement diminish, and as the risk of a boundary crossing diminish, so does the amount of social welfare needed to make permissible such an action. On any reasonable conception of welfare, some infringements of our property rights threaten us with only trivial harms and so should presumably be more cheaply bought by social welfare. Indeed, as we have seen this must be so if just about any pollution or tiny risks of infringement is to be permissible. 
On the resulting conception, the fact that something is one’s property provides protection in proportion to how important it is for the owner that the thing not be infringed upon. So perhaps the fact that an infringement causes N amount of the relevant sort of infringement-harm requires that the act produce at least 20N of social good to be permissible.​[36]​ This allows the less serious infringements to be bought for less social good, it retains a deontological, rights based approach, it vindicates the thought that because something is mine I have say over what may be done with it well beyond the extent to which I can create the most good with it, it vindicates the thought that the fact that we own a penny or a pin gives us a claim that others not take such things from us, yet it can explain in a principled way why flying normally safe planes overhead is permissible. It vindicates the intuition that you may borrow my tennis racket without my permission if you need to do so to save a life yet you may not take my kidney to save a life. It avoids in a principled way the Conflation Problems.​[37]​ Such a view looks much less ad hoc than VSO’s proposal, it is more determinate than their proposal, and it solves the concerns just mentioned above about their view. Finally, the emerging view can offer an explanation for why someone might have been mislead into supposing our property rights are so uniformly powerful. A person might make such a mistake by focusing on and inducting from cases like the kidney example above where our property rights really do offer very powerful protections.
A person might well complain that there will be no single multiplier that will allow us to capture both the intuition that we must not take the kidney and that we may turn the trolley. This seems a legitimate worry. There are several possible replies; 1) we could reject the entire framework, 2) we could live with some of our intuitions being bruised and settle for them being bruised less than on a traditional self-ownership view or a consequentialist view, or 3) we could add to the framework by, for example, claiming the multiplier is greater for harms intended rather than merely foreseen.​[38]​
The most obvious way to respond to the general challenge highlighted by the pollution and risk cases would be to distinguish between important property rights and relatively trivial ones and be willing to sell violations of the less important property rights relatively cheaply for social good. That is, the view might provide a theory of value that explains why some property rights are more significant than others by showing that some such rights protect more valuable things and others protect only trivial things.​[39]​

3: Problems With the Obvious Solution for the Traditional Conclusions

The most obvious, compelling, and principled way we have found to respond to the Conflation Problem within a self-ownership framework is to distinguish between important property rights and relatively trivial ones and be willing to sell violations of the less important property rights relatively cheaply for social good. That is, the view would provide a theory that explains why some property rights are more significant than others by showing that some such rights protect more valuable things and others protect only trivial things. The central problem we have found is not that the rights of self-ownership are conceived to be very strong, although they are, but rather that there is too little discrimination in what sorts of infringements trigger the full protection of such rights. 
The problem for the emerging self-ownership view (call it the Value-Sensitive Self-Ownership View) is not that there are no credible ways to distinguish between more and less significant infringements. Rather the problem is that there is no reason to be hopeful that there is a plausible theory of value that explains the differences in significance in property rights infringements in a way that simultaneously provides three things our traditional libertarian needs: 1) the distinction in significance of rights stems somehow from the thought that we are self-owners, or at least is not ad hoc or in tension with the Self-Ownership Thesis, 2) it vindicates traditional libertarian conclusions such as the broad impermissibility of paternalism and the near inviolability of our body when it comes to taking money, hair or blood for others who badly need it, yet 3) it makes room for infringements on our property rights where we think we surely must permit them, such as in the case of pollution, acceptable risks such as flying planes over people’s heads, and soft-paternalism cases such as pushing people out of the way of busses. Call these the three criteria of adequacy for a theory of value that vindicated the Self-Ownership Thesis as it has been traditionally urged. The challenge for traditional understandings of the upshot of the Self-Ownership Thesis is to come up with a theory of value that combines these three features.​[40]​ 
Let us consider the two broad types of theories of the variable significance of different infringements our libertarian might offer. This theory of value can either defer to the agent’s own point of view in determining what makes an infringement more or less serious or not. Just to have labels, albeit imperfect one’s, let’s call the former subjectivist and the latter objectivist. There will be many different objective and subjective theories. All subjective theories will, in one way or another, defer to the agent’s will, choices, or preferences under certain conditions. To simply matters, I will focus on cases where the agent’s will or choices are aligned with her preferences. That is, all the relevant subjectivist options point in the same direction.​[41]​
If the theory of value is objectivist, then although the agent who does not consent to infringement A or B but who expressly wills and prefers that A happen rather than B will, in some cases, nonetheless enjoy less protection from B than from A simply because infringement B is considered a less significant infringement on that agent’s property. There will be cases where there is enough social good involved to make infringement B permissible but not infringement A. I want to say that whatever is generating this view about the relative moral significance of these actions, it is not stemming from the agent’s self-ownership. To the extent that our ranking of the significance of different actions was stemming from the self-ownership of the agent the ranking should reflect in some way the agent’s own view of the significance of the infringements upon her. If anything is bad about, for example, paternalism on a self-ownership view, it is that others who do not own something are making decisions about what will happen to that thing without gaining the consent of the person whose property it is. Naturally then, if we are looking for an account of what made one infringement worse than another on a self-ownership view we should think it is that one infringement is even less responsive to the will of the person whose property is being infringed. 
Imagine what it would be for the opposite to be true. We would have to think that while Joe is a competent adult who fully owns something and unreservedly prefers that we infringe upon it in way A rather than B, nonetheless, because it is his property we should infringe in way B rather than A. The absurdity of that claim suggests that the objective account of what makes infringements differentially significant is a poor fit with the self-ownership view. That is, I am claiming this theory of value fails to capture well the first criteria of adequacy discussed above for a theory of value that fits with the Self-Ownership Thesis.
Alternatively, if our libertarian uses a subjectivist theory of value here, she will have a hard time vindicating the claim that there are powerful general considerations against forbidding someone from engaging in homosexual sex or forcing them to avoid saturated fats. People care about such prohibitions to different extents. Some may not much mind such infringements while not doing anything that counts as having consented to them. We do not consent to something merely by not minding it much. So the problem on the subjective side is that what different people value can differ so widely. As a result, the subjective theory of value will not be able to vindicate the thought that there are classes of actions, such as freedom of conscience, or freedom from interference with self-regarding actions, that we all enjoy powerful protections from. On the view under discussion there will be people who do not value or only slightly value this or that traditional libertarian sphere of protection, and then they will not enjoy powerful protections against infringements into that sphere. Such people will, on the subjectivist theory of value under consideration, enjoy only weak protections against some infringements. The traditional libertarian claim that we all enjoy powerful protections against action that infringes upon our property in such ways will not be vindicated. The threatened result would be that the status of our supposed libertarian protections of our Millian liberties on the value-responsive libertarian account will be quite subject to empirical fortune, not unlike consequentialism. Thus I am claiming such views score poorly in vindicating the second criteria of adequacy for a theory of value that can serve the needs of the Self-Ownership Thesis as it has traditionally been conceived. 
I have so far tried to stress reasons that a self-ownership view seems to fit best with a subjective account of the significance of infringements. But in truth I would think any reasonable conception of the significance of infringements, whether subjectivist or objectivist, would have to allow that a range of infringements of the sort the traditional view rules out are not very significant and so we are entitled to only weak protections against them. 




I have argued that the Conflation Problem poses a serious challenge to The Self-Ownership Thesis and that the best way for such views to respond to the challenge is to reject All Infringements are Equal and allow that different kinds of infringements merit different levels of protection. We considered several other ways the view might be amended to handle the challenge and found them less compelling. 
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